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1 Introduction
There is quite a number of systems these days, known as cryp-
tographic [1], which allow to protect transmitted information
from unauthorized access. While estimating the usage charac-
teristics of these cryptographic systems, the following factors
can be used: the required computing resources to complete the
encryption and decryption of information, the need for devel-
opment of specialized hardware and its usage, the cost, etc.
However, it is typical for modern distributed monitoring sys-
tems [2, 8] to fast process information of totally different types,
such as commands sent to systemmodules, text messages, B&W
and colour photos, photo plans, motion pictures and photo doc-
uments, and others. The required encryption/decryption speed
in this type of systems can be preliminary estimated as reaching
6 MBits per sec, and more.
Given the high speed and diversity of information, as well as
the fact that modern distributed monitoring systems are designed
using modules of built-in type, choosing the encryption method
calls for a thoroughly detailed approach.
Using exchange of information between two hypothetical
subjects Alice and Bob as an example, this paper will discuss
methods widely used in cryptography, as well as methods based
on logical transforms of binary sequences employing multipli-
cation of binary matrices by columns of fragments of messages
being encrypted in the GF (2) field [3, 4].
2 Analysis of known approaches
One-Time-Pad.One-Time-Pad (Vernam’s Cipher) [1] is built
as follows: to the binary sequence of a message, e.g. S =
1011101001011101, Alice adds in mod2 a random key, e.g. K
= 1001011100110111, and gets S⊕K= 0010110101101010.
This sequence is sent to Bob.
Bob does symbol-by-symbol mod2 addition of the received
message to the key E˛, thus restoring the original message:
S⊕K= 0010110101101010
K = 1001011100110111
————————————
S = 1011101001011101
According to C. Shannon’s theory [5], One-Time-Pad can be
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an ideal secrecy system only when the following conditions are
met:
a) the length of the key is equal to the length of the message;
b) the key is absolutely random;
c) the key is destroyed after every transmission session.
Meeting these requirements is very difficult. Thus, if there
is a secret channel for the transmission of the key, then in some
cases it is quite reasonable to send the message itself, but not the
key, over this channel. Also, it is extremely difficult to obtain
a true random key. Random sequence generators on feedback
registers are known not to be able to provide true random se-
quences. To generate such sequences, it is necessary to have the
number of 1s equal to the number of 0s, the number of pairs of
1s equal to the number of pairs of 0s, etc. Also, the probability
of 2s, 3s and so on, must be decreasing following a certain rule.
However, even if these conditions are met, the key will not be
truly random, since it is obtained using deterministic methods,
and when those are repeated, the same ‘true’ sequence will be
realized. Sequences with good random properties can be pro-
duced using noise generators with subsequent processing [1].
Still, even when a sequence close to random is obtained, there
remains a task of supplying this sequence to the sending and re-
ceiving sides. Shannon’s third requirement is to destroy the key
after every transmission. This means that a very difficult opera-
tion of supplying both sending and receiving sides with the same
key is to be continually executed.
The encryption/decryption speed in this case is equal to one
operation per bit of information. The proof of security is very
strong, and with the message and the key long enough, the sys-
tem will not be cracked.
A notion of ultimate secrecy that a system can provide is in-
troduced in [6]. In this case the probability of every message a
posteriori is equal to its a priory probability, and the unautho-
rized interceptor who grabs the message does not get any extra
information.
However, using the One-Time-Pad, just mentioned, to con-
trol distributed systems transferring diverse information is not
appropriate for the following reasons:
• providing intermittently long one-time keys to both send-
ing and receiving sides causes significant delays and requires
more sophisticated electronics;
• with a big number of simultaneously controlled objects in the
system, every one of them would require a different key se-
quence generated and sent;
• ultimate proof of security for the tasks mentioned is not nec-
essary, since the actual time of the information transferred is
counted by hours, or days in the worst case.
Flow ciphers. Flow ciphers use pseudo-random sequence
generators based on a few (usually three) feedback registers with
their outputs combined. Pseudo-random properties are achieved
here with non-linear functions [1]. Blaiser and Heintzmann have
been the first to note that if the combining function allows the
information of component function to pass through, then crack-
ing such a cryptography system can be done much faster. In one
of his works Thomas Siegentaler (1984) introduced the notion
of the correlation-immune function that provides the best non-
linearity when generator outputs are combined.
Flow ciphers usually require absolutely identical hardware
implementation of generators on both sending and receiving
sides. The general encryption scheme is close to that of the
One-Time-Pad. The encryption/decryption speed is as high as
1 operation per bit. Software realization of the method usually
gets more complicated, though, because the generators must be
reset for every new sequence. As a result, the pseudo-random
sequence has to be used for a long time, which makes the sys-
tem’s proof of security lower. In general, the proof of security
of flow ciphers is determined by the parameters of the pseudo-
random generators. In spite of all those shortcomings, many
users are very interested in them because of their high speed [1].
Still, in the applications discussed, flow ciphers do not look ef-
ficient, since synchronization of a few pairs of pseudo-random
generators is quite a daunting task.
DES-type ciphers. Methods of information protection based
on DES (Data Encryption Standard) and its modifications
(3DES, DEA, etc,), where encryption/decryption is done with
a sequence of standard transformations of the key and the se-
quence to be encrypted (decrypted), have been widely spread
for quite a while.
DES is a block cipher with a 64-bit block size. The key length
is 56 bits, and 8 bits are added for parity control. A block of open
text (64 bits) is subjected to permutation before processing, and
to inverse permutation after encryption. This procedure is not a
requirement and does not change the proof of security of the al-
gorithm [1], so it is often omitted in software realization. Then
the block is broken into left (L) and right parts, 32 bits each.
16 rounds of transformation, called function f, are performed,
where data is mixed with the key. In each round the bits of the
key are shifted, then 48 bits are masked out from the 56 bits of
the key. The right half of the data (32 bits) is increased to 48 bits
by applying permutation with expanding, is mod2 added to the
48 bits of the shifted and permutated key, undergoes transforma-
tion with 8 blocks, called S-blocks, thus producing 32 new bits,
and is permutated again. The result of the f transform is mod2
added to the left half. This yields a new right half. And the old
right half becomes the new left half.
All DES transforms are in public domain, they have been re-
searched and published many times. Their down side is low
speed and the need for constant key changes on both sending
and receiving sides. The encryption speed is low, the proof of
security depends on the size of the key. With a 56 bit key the
number of key matching variants is > 6.4 · 1016. In fact, the
number of variants is significantly smaller, since keys contain-
ing too few or too many 1s and 0s obviously would not fit and
should be excluded from all 56 bit keys. Thus, a key containing
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0,1,2 or 3 1s can hardly be used.
Since the DES cryptosystem has been known well for quite
a while, there have been numerous attempts to break it. It is
believed that there are DES-breaking algorithms [1] that allow to
decipher an unknown text on a modern computer in 3-5 minutes.
We do not believe that using DES-type ciphers in distributed
systems with a large number of controlled clients makes sense.
RSA-type ciphers. An RSA-type cryptosystem with modules
of size around hundreds of decimal digits provides strong proof
of security, that can even be increased by choosing large basic
prime modules P and Q. The idea of the RSA-type system is
simple enough.
The receiving side chooses two large prime numbers P and Q,
finds the product P*Q=N, and openly publishes N. Only those
who can factor N can find the Euler function ϕ (N) = (P-1)(Q-1).
Then the receiving side chooses the public key E and publishes
it along with N. E must conform to the following: (E, ϕ (N)) =
1 and 1< E < ϕ (N). Then the secret key D is calculated from
DE ≡ 1 mod ϕ (N). Finding D is possible using the extended
Euclidean algorithm. Since E and ϕ (N) are coprimes, this con-
gruence always has a solution.
When the original text fragment m is sent to the receiver, it
is encrypted by raising it to the open power of E in mod N, i.e.
mE ≡ S1 mod N. Decryption is done by raising S1 to the secret
power D (mod N):
(mE )DmodN ≡ mEDmodN . (1)
It is known from the Number Theory [6] that if a ≡ b mod N is
true, then we can find an integer t such that a = b+ N · t . Since
the secret key D is obtained from DE ≡ 1 mod ϕ (N), then
ED = 1+ ϕ(N ) · t. (2)
The value of ED substituted into (2) gives
mED mod N≡ m(1+ϕ(N )∗t) mod N ≡ m mod N, since m ϕ(N )·t
mod N ≡ 1 mod N according to the Euler’s theorem [6], i.e. the
receiver will restore the original message.
For example, let P = 23, Q =31. The product of these two
prime numbers N = 713. The Euler function ϕ(N ) = 22 · 30 =
660. The canonical form of 660 is 660 = 22 · 3 · 5 · 11. Thus, the
public key can be set to E = 17 (it will be coprimes with all the
primes of the factored 660, which conforms to the conditions of
choosing the public key). The secret key can be found from the
congruence 17 · D ≡ 1 mod 660. Using searching of variants,
let us find D = 233, in fact, 17 · 233 = 3961 ≡ 1 mod 660.
Suppose we need to send a message whose decimal form is
39 (binary representation is 100111).
Let us encrypt it by raising it to the power 17 mod 713:
3917 ≡ ((394)2)2 · 39 ≡ ((469)2)2 · 39 ≡
(357)2 · 39 ≡ 535 · 39 ≡ 188mod713.
Thus, the encrypted form of 39 is 188. The latter is sent to
the receiving side. In this transform we used the congruence’s
property that any of its arithmetic fragments can be substituted
by the remainder in a mod.
Decryption is done by raising 188 to the power of 233 in mod
713. It is not difficult to complete, but quite cumbersome. To do
it, let us represent 233 in a binary form: 11101001 and write:
188233 ≡ (((((((188)2)2)2)2)2)2)2 · ((((((188)2)2)2)2)2)2 ·
(((((188)2)2)2)2)2 · (((188)2)2)2 · 188 ≡ mod713 ≡
((((((407)2)2)2)2)2)2 · (((((407)2)2)2)2)2 · (((407)2)2)2)2 ·
((407)2)2 · 188 ≡ (((((233)2)2)2)2)2 · ((((233)2)2)2)2 ·
(((233)2)2)2 · (233)2 · 188 ≡ ((((101)2)2)2)2 · (((101)2)2)2 ·
((101)2)2 · 101 · 188 ≡ (((219)2)2)2 · ((219)2)2 · (219)2 · 450 ≡
((190)2)2 · (190)2 · 190 · 450 ≡ (450)2 · 450 · 653 ≡ 8 · 94 ≡
39mod713.
The proof of security of the RSA system is based on the fact,
that even knowing N, it is very difficult to factor it and find the
two primes P and Q. Of course, with small primes P and Q,
N can be factored pretty easily. However, if P and Q are as
large as 100 decimal digits, the enumeration will be in the range
of 10100. Since there are no general polynomial algorithms to
factor numbers into primes, and the enumeration algorithm is
exponential, factoring so large numbers cannot be performed on
any existing computers.
The complexity of encryption/decryption, which significantly
lowers the transmission speed, can also be considered a defi-
ciency of the RSA cryptosystem. Changing modules is also a
fairly difficult task, in both finding pairs of primes and their stor-
ing.
Realization of RSA-type algorithms in computer code is very
ineffective, because it requires a lot of compound arithmetic op-
erations. Hardwarewise, it calls for use of specialized proces-
sors, but even then the time required is very long. In a general
case, using RSA for monitoring in distributed net systems is also
ineffective.
3 Two-step message transmission employing modular
arithmetic
A message can be sent directly from Alice to Bob in a few
sessions using very large modules.
Let us first consider the case where Alice and Bob, over an
open channel, agree to use for their message encryption some
very large prime number P. For example, let P be 200 decimal
digits long. Then Alice can cipher her message by raising it to
some power x, known to her only, and send it to Bob. Bob can
raise the received message to the power y, known only to him,
and send it back to Alice. Alice will ‘remove’ her power x and
send the message to Bob. Bob ‘removes’ his power y and reads
the message.
Generally, the scheme looks as follows:
Alice takes the message which she wants to send to Bob and
raises it to some power x, (x, P − 1) = 1:
mx ≡ S1modP
and sends it to Bob.
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Bob raises S1 to some power y, (y, P) = 1 : SY1 ≡ mxy ≡
S2modP .
and sends it back to Alice.
Alice must remove her key x , and for this she has to take an
x-th root from S2. This can be done the following way:
If S2 is raised to the power k1 = 1+ (P − 1)t1x , where t1 is
integer, such that the numerator of the fraction k1 is divided by
x without a remainder, then the result will be m y ≡ S3 mod P .
This value (S3) Alice sends to Bob.
To remove his key, Bob can raise S3 to the power of k2
=
1+(P−1)t2
x , and as a result will restore the original message m.
Example 1 Let P = 103. P-1 = 102 = 2 · 51. Alice wants to
send a message m = 83.
Alice raises 83 to a power known only to her, for example x =
35 (x and 102 are twin primes) in mod 103:
8335 ≡ (((((83)2)2)2)2)2·(83)2·83≡ ((((91)2)2)2)2·91·83 ≡
(((41)2)2)2 · 34 ≡ ((33)2)2 · 34 ≡ (59)2 · 34 ≡ 7 mod 103
and sends the result (number 7) to Bob. Bob raises the received
number to the power known only to him, for example, y = 67
(this number is also a twin prime of 102):
(7)67 ≡ ((((((7)2)2)2)2)2)2 · (7)2 · 7 ≡ ((((32)2)2)2)2 · 34 ≡
(((97)2)2)2 · 34 ≡ ((36)2)2 · 34 ≡
(60)2 · 34 ≡ 36 mod 103 and sends the result (36) to Alice.
Alice ‘removes’ her power x, resolving
k1 ≡ 1+102∗1235 ≡ 35 mod 103 and raising 36 to the power of
35:
(36)35 ≡ (((((36)2)2)2)2)2 · (36)2 · 36 ≡ ((((60)2)2)2)2 ·
60 · 36 ≡ (((98)2)2)2 · 100 ≡ ((25)2)2 · 100 ≡ (7)2 · 100 ≡ 59
mod 103.
The result (number 59) is sent to Bob. Bob ‘removes”’ his
power y resolving
K2 ≡ 1+102∗4467 ≡ 67 mod 103 and raising 59 to the power of
67:
(59)67 ≡ ((((((59)2)2)2)2)2)2 ·(59)2 ·59 ≡ (((((82)2)2)2)2)2 ·
82 · 59 ≡ ((((29)2)2)2)2 · 100 ≡ (((17)2)2)2 · 100 ≡ ((83)2)2 ·
100 ≡ (91)2 · 100 ≡ 41 · 100 ≡ 83 mod 103.
4 Forming the common key over the open channel
To form the common key over the open channel, Diffie and
Hellman’s idea can be used [1].
Let us assume that Alice and Bob have agreed to use some
very large prime number P as a module. Besides, Alice and Bob
chose for this P a primitive root g, i.e. the least number a, which
conforms to ga ≡ 1 mod P and is equal to P-1. More precise
definition of ‘primitive root in mod N’ can be found in [6].
Alice raises the primitive root g to the power known only to
her, finds the remainder in mod P gk1 ≡ S1 mod P, and openly
sends the remainder S1 to Bob. Bob raises the primitive root g
to the power k2 known to him only, obtains the remainder S2 in
mod P, and sends S2 to Alice. Then Alice raises S2 to the power
of k2, and Bob raises S1 to the power of k2 in mod Ð, and they
both get the same key K = gk1k1 mod P.
Further on, Alice and Bob can both use this common key, for
example, when working with a symmetrical DES system. If the
key is to be changed, the exchange procedure is repeated with
new k1 and k2. A deficiency of this method of key distribution
is that common key formation is significantly delayed, a special
calculator to find the remainders in large mod is needed, and
synchronization has to be used while transferring diverse infor-
mation from A to B.
Example 2 Let P = 103. The primitive root for this P will be
g = 2. To confirm this, let us put P-1 in its canonical form:
102 = 2 · 51. Since neither 22, nor 251 cannot be compared to 1
in mod 103, 102 is the lowest power which proves 2102 ≡ 1 mod
103 (Fermat theorem).
Suppose Alice chose k1 = 7, and Bob chose k2 = 11. Then the
following data exchange will take place:
27 ≡ 25 mod 103
211 ≡ 91 mod 103
and they both obtain the same key:
A: 917 ≡ 38 mod 103 B: 2511 ≡ 38 mod 103
The eavesdropper, knowing P and g and having caught S1
and S2, will not be able to calculate the common key gk1k2 mod
P. This is assured by the following.
Let ax= b, and x is to be found. Now write
x log a = log b, and find x = log alog b . That is, the solution is
easily found.
If we have
ax ≡ bmodP, (3)
in which the values of a, b, and P are known, then x in a general
case is found by enumeration. The task of resolving the congru-
ence of type (2) is called a task of discrete logarithmization. De-
spite the obvious achievements in this field in the recent past, for
arbitrary modules P the solution is close to total enumeration.
If P is in the range of 100 decimal digits, then the values of k1
and k2 will be in the same range, and enumeration of 10100will
be required to resolve the congruence, which cannot be done –
in any reasonable time limit.
The reviewed method is very effective, but not appropriate for
the tasks being considered in this paper because of the need
for multiple exchange of information in key formation, and the
complexity of the encryption/decryption algorithms (arithmetic
operations of raising to a power, dividing, and finding the least
positive remainders).
So, none of the methods reviewed so far can be effectively
used while building an information exchange system with a
large number of controlled modules in a distributed net moni-
toring system.
5 Encryption based on matrices with unit determinants
over the GF (2) field
An encryption/decryption method utilizing multiplication of
matrices with unit determinants over the GF (2) Galois field has
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been proposed in [3]. This approach is quite attractive, because
only elementary Boolean operations (mod2 additions) are used
in encryption/decryption. Both software and hardware imple-
mentations can be done quickly. Matrices with determinants
equal to 1 in the Galois field produce cyclic subgroups that
are attained by raising the original matrices to a certain power.
Thus, in [3] the well-developed mathematics of matrix algebra,
along with the methods of group theory, is proposed for encryp-
tion/decryption, which allows for encryption systems analysis
and synthesis with the goal of their optimization.
Encryption utilizing matrices over the Galois field agrees very
well with applying correction codes in both hardware and soft-
ware, which allows for information protection from both trans-
mission errors and eavesdropping. Let Us look at some exam-
ples of message encryption/decryption that use matrix multipli-
cation in the GF (2) field. We have a matrix with elements from
the GF (2) field, whose determinant is equal to 1 and is cal-
culated in mod2. This means that all matrices with odd deter-
minants will have a determinant equal to 1 in the field, and all
matrices with even determinants will have a zero determinant in
the field. Besides, the message fragment T to be encrypted will
also be represented in a binary sequence. The result of encryp-
tion will be the product of the matrix multiplied by a column of
the message from the left. For example, if the given matrix M is
of size (7, 7) and the fragment T to be encrypted is 7 bits long
(decimal representation of letter ‘s’ in ASCII), then the result of
encryption will be the following:
M =

1110100
1001001
1010100
0001011
1010010
0000111
0010100

·

1
1
1
0
0
1
1

=

1
0
0
0
1
0
1

Or, for short: M · s = @, since the binary code 1000101is
ASCII code of ‘@’.
To decipher the message, we have to find M−1, the inverse of
M, such that M−1 · M = I , where I is a unit matrix like this:
I =

1000000
0100000
0010000
0001000
0000100
0000010
0000001

, then, since M−1 =

0010001
1010000
0101100
0100111
0101101
0111001
0010110

, it
is easy to verify, that

0010001
1010000
0101100
0100111
0101101
0111001
0010110

·

1
0
0
0
1
0
1

=

1
1
1
0
0
1
1

, or
M−1 ·@ = s .
In the example above we encrypted a binary row of the mes-
sage, and the size of matrix n was equal to the length of the
binary sequence. Now, let us consider the case where the con-
trolling command is much longer than n = 7, for example, this:
10111100101101. We will break the command into two-bit
blocks, and will get 7 blocks. Encryption/decryption is done
in the same fashion, using one multiplication in every step:
Encryption:

1110100
1001001
1010100
0001011
1010010
0000111
0010100

·

10
11
11
00
10
11
01

=

00
11
11
10
10
00
01

, decryp-
tion:

0010001
1010000
0101100
0100111
0101101
0111001
0010110

·

00
11
11
10
10
00
01

=

10
11
11
00
10
11
01

.
In a general case, if the encrypted sequence is of length N,
and the size of the matrix is n, the entire sequence is broken
into n blocks, each being N’/n long, where N’ is a sequence
padded with 0s or 1s, such that it can be divided by n without a
remainder.
While encrypting text messages, it is possible and advisable
to encrypt messages with fragments that are multiples of a few
letters, better yet if those fragments contain only parts of letters.
Suppose we want to encrypt the message ‘We go home.’
Considering spaces, this message can be represented in ASCII
code in a decimal form this way: 87 101 32 103 111 32 116 111
32 104 111 109 101 46. Since the number of symbols in the
message is 14, let us break it into 7 fragments, 2 symbols each,
encode them with ASCII, and multiply matrix M by a column
of binary representations of the symbols. This yields
125 68 24 51 87 59 79 74 46 106 36 98 38 5.
If the sequence obtained is multiplied by matrix M−1 from
the left, we will restore the original message ‘We go to home’.
The entire message can be broken into 2 blocks, 7 letters each,
and encryption can be done in two steps: first, the first block,
then the second. Decryption should also be done by blocks.
However, it is likely that better results will be obtained if the
entire 24-letter message is broken into 2 letter blocks and en-
crypted in one step. Encryption will be faster and the result will
be more difficult to crack. A still better method is to use frag-
ments contain only parts of the letters, for example 2 37 of each
letter.
Images can be encrypted using the same matrix. To do this,
the entire image can be broken into 7 fragments, and these frag-
ments are mod2 added together in accordance with the 1s of the
matrix M. The resulting image will lack contours, so the inter-
Fast encryption of various types of messages 272007 51 1
ceptor will not be able to detect it.
So, the discussed method, using multiplication of the mes-
sage to be encrypted by the matrix M from the left in the GF
(2) field, allows for high speed encryption of diverse messages:
commands, texts, images, without changing the encrypting ma-
trix.
Since in this encryption only elementary Boolean mod2 addi-
tion operations are used, encryption and decryption are very fast.
This is especially noticeable in comparison with those methods
that require the use of arithmetic operations for encryption and
decryption of the messages (RSA, systems using modular arith-
metic), including hardware realization in programmable logic
modules [?9].
Matrix Properties in the GF (2) field. Let us look at some
useful properties of matrices with the elements from the GF (2)
field. The power of the set (the number) of (n, n) matrices with
the elements {0,1} is 2n
2
. This is quite obvious, since the num-
ber of elements of any such matrix is n2. Among those matri-
ces, however, there are some with even determinants. In the GF
(2) field they have zero determinants. We exclude from the set
of (n, n) matrices all singular matrices (the ones that have zero
determinants). The remaining set of matrices constitutes non-
communicative group on multiplication. And in fact, a set of
these matrices is enclosed around multiplication, the association
axiom holds true, the neutral element (it is the unit matrix I) ax-
iom holds true, and the inverse element axiom holds true, i.e.
for every matrixM there can be found a matrix of the same size,
such that M · M−1 = I. The only axiom that fails is the general
case communicative axiom. And the number of matrices of the
(n, n) size is finite.
Number of matrices of (n, n) size with unit determinant in
the GF (2) field. To find the number of (n, n) matrices with the
determinant equal to 1, we will use the following procedure. If
there is a matrix of (n-1, n-1) size with the determinant equal to
1, then a matrix of (n, n) size with the unit determinant can be
obtained by adding to it from below a row of n-1 zeros and one
1, with an arbitrary column placed over the 1. Let Us find out
how many different matrices of (n, n) size can be obtained from
each (n-1, n-1) matrix.
Since the column over the only 1 can be arbitrary, the number
of matrices should be increased by 2n−1. Besides, in the ob-
tained matrix a number of various linear combinations of rows
can be performed, putting the result in place of the last row, as
well as adding to the (n-1, n-1) matrix a column of n-1 zeros
and one 1, performing the same linear combinations and putting
the result in place of the last column. Then, if the number of
matrices of the size (n-1, n-1) with the determinant equal to 1 is
P (n-1), then the number of matrices of the size (n, n) with the
determinant equal to 1 will be
P(n) = (2n − 1) · 2n−1 · P(n − 1).
It is easy to determine that the number of (1,1) matrices with
the determinant equal to 1 is 1 (this is the matrix (1)), and the
number of (2,2) matrices with the determinant equal to 1 is 6.
We write these matrices below:(
10
01
)
,
(
11
01
)
,
(
01
10
)
,
(
10
11
)
,
(
11
10
)
,
(
01
11
)
.
Therefore, the number of (3,3) matrices with the determinant
equal to 1 will be (23− 1) · 23−1 · 6 = 7 · 4 · 6 = 168. Similarly,
we find the number of (n, n) matrices with the unit determinant
from:
P(n) = (2n − 1)(2n−1 − 1). . .3 · 2n(n−1)/2 (4)
To use this estimate is very inconvenient, so let us find the low
estimate of the number of matrices in the form of the power of
2.
The low estimate of the number of (n, n) matrices with the
determinant equal to 1 can be obtained in the following way.
Let Us take P = (2n –1)(2n−1 –1). . . (22-1). We multiply its
members in general and leave only the first 3 major members. If
we denote R = n+(n-1)+(n-2)+. . .+3+2 = (n2+n-2)/2, then the
first three major members will take the form 2R- 2R−2-2R−3. . .
The following members will be either positive or negative, but
their powers will be decreasing. Then P will be in this range:
2R > (2n − 1)(2n−1 − 1). . .(22 − 1) > 2R−1.
We can take 2R−1 for the low estimate. Then the low estimate
of the number of (n, n) matrices with the determinant equal to 1
will be:
N > 2n
2−2
Table 1 shows the number of all the (n, n) matrices in the GF
(2) Galois field (column 2), the precise estimate of the number of
matrices with the determinant equal to 1 (column 3), and the low
estimate of the number of (n, n) matrices with the determinant
equal to 1 (column 4).
The low estimate of (20,20) matrices is 2398. Using the ob-
vious 210 >103, we reckon that the number of (20,20) matrices
with the unit determinant is larger than 2.5 · 10119. This number
is so large that without knowing M and only knowing, for exam-
ple, its size, the eavesdropper, trying to crack the message, will
not be able to enumerate all the matrices of this size.
Let us take an arbitrary matrix of the size (n, n) with the de-
terminant equal to 1 in the GF(2) field and raise it subsequently
to the powers 2,3,4,. . . A number s, such that Ms = I, will be
found. This comes from the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (7) . Let G be an arbitrary finite group. Then the set
of powers of any of its elements g ∈G: {g,g2,g3,. . . ,gs = e, where
e is a neutral element of G} forms an always communicative
group, called a cyclic group; here s is the order of the cyclic
group, and
g−1 = gs−1.
Thus, for any matrix M with the determinant equal to 1 put
subsequently to the powers 2,3,4,... there will always be some
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Tab. 1.
n Number of all matrices
N = 2n
2
Number of matrices with determi-
nant equal to 1 (precise)
Low estimate for ma-
trices of the size (n,n)
1 2 1 0.5
2 24 6 22
3 29 7*3*23 27
4 216 15*7*3*2 214
5 225 31·15 · 7 · 3 · 210 223
6 236 63·31 · 15 · 7 · 3 · 215 234
7 249 127·63 · 31 · 15 · 7 · 3 · 221 247
8 264 255·127 · 63 · 31 · 15 · 7 · 3 · 228 262
9 281 511·255 · 127 · 63 · 31 · 15 · 7 · 3 · 236 279
10 2100 1023·511·255·127·63·31·15·7·3·245 298
power s, such that Ms = I. Here s is the rank of the cyclic group
produced by the matrix M, and M−1 =Ms−1.
We should note that s will always be a divisor (3), since the
rank of any subgroup is a divisor of the rank of the [7].
Valid operations on matrices. Let us look at a set of matrices
of the (n, n) size with the elements from the GF (p) field. All
operations will be performed in the finite field GF (p). These
operations will be: matrix multiplication with elements calcu-
lation in the GF (p) field, matrix division, multiplication of a
matrix by a vector, determinants calculation, linear combination
of matrices’ rows. The rows (columns) of such matrices can be
viewed as vectors, addition of two vectors being defined as ad-
dition of corresponding components of those vectors in the field,
and multiplication of a vector by a scalar being defined as mul-
tiplication of every component by a scalar from the field GF (p).
In this paper we are mainly interested in square matrices of the
size (n, n).
The multiplication operation in the field is done in the regular
way. The operation of dividing the matrix M1by the matrixM2is
done by multiplication of the matrixM1by a matrix inverse to
the matrix M2, i.e.
M1
M2
= M1 · M−12
Because a set of matrices forms a group, the division opera-
tion is valid.
For these matrices we can set forth and prove the following
1 Multiplication of two matrices M1 and M2 of the size (n, n)
with the unit determinants in the GF (2) field yields a matrix
with the unit determinant in the GF (2) field.
2 Permutation of any rows (and columns) of a matrix does not
change its determinant in the GF (2) field. The rank of a cyclic
group produced by this matrix does not change, which is eas-
ily proven by an example.
3 Replacing any row of a matrix with a linear combination
(mod2 addition) of this row with any other rows of this matrix
does not change the determinant of the matrix, but changes
the rank of the cyclic group, produced by this matrix.
Randomizing properties of multiplication in the GF (2) field.
One important property of the encryption method employing
matrices in the GF (2) field should be noted here. Suppose we
have a sequence of 1s and 0s, in which the probability of 1 is
p, and the probability of 0 is respectively 1-p. We choose an
arbitrary pair of symbols in this sequence and mod2 add them
together. The probability of 1 in the resulting sequence will be
P (1) = 2p(1-p), and the probability of 0 1- 2p(1-p) respectively.
Now, let us mod2 add together 3 arbitrary bits of this sequence.
Then the probability of 1 in the resulting sequence will be 3p
(1-p)2 + p3. Having this in mind, let us build a table of probabil-
ities of 1 after n mod2 additions (the probability of 0 will always
be P (0)=1-P (1), so it will not be shown in Table 2).
To infer the formula in Table 2, the property of mod2 addition
of n arguments of the function was used. The function resolves
to 1, if the number of 1s in its true/false table is odd, and to 0
otherwise.
The right column of the table shows that even if the sequence
is too asymmetrical (p = 0,9), after nine mod2 additions of the
bits, the resulting sequence becomes practically pseudo-random
(P (1) and P (0) ≈ 0.5).
To perform multiplication of the matrix by a column in the
GF (2) field, the fragments to be encrypted are mod2 added to-
gether, and the larger the size of the matrix, the more additions
are done, since the number of 1s in each row of the matrix is ap-
proximately equal to the half of the elements of the row, and is
growing with n. Thus, the discussed method of message encryp-
tion randomizes the result, and the encrypted message should
look like random.
Potential properties of the encryption method that uses ma-
trices in the GF (2) field. If matrices producing cyclic groups
of very big ranks are used for encryption, it is possible to solve
some problems similar to those solved with modular arithmetic.
It is possible to transmit a secret message and form a secret
key, if matrices over the GF (2) field are used, similar to the
Diffie and Hellman’s idea [1].
To show this, let us make three obvious assumptions.
1 To raise any matrix to any (even very large) power is easy. It
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Tab. 2. Probability of 1 in a sequence obtained from mod2 addition of some bits of the original (probability P (1) = p) sequence
n P(1) P(1) with p = 0.9 Subtraction mod P(1)- 0.5
1 p 0.9 0.4
2 2p(p-1) 0.18 0.32
3 3p(1-p)2+p3 0.756 0.256
4 4p(1-p)3 + 4p3(1-p) 0.2952 0.2048
5 5p(1-p)4 + 10p3(1-p)2 + p5 0.66384 0.16384
6 6p(1-p)5 + 20p3(1-p)3 + 6p5(1-p) 0.368928 0.131072
7 7p(1-p)6 + 35p3(1-p)4 + 21p5(1-p)2 + p7 0.60485193 0.10485193
8 8p(1-p)7+56p3(1-p)5+56p5(1-p)3+8p7(1-p) 0.41611392 0.08388608
9 9p(1-p)8+84p3(1-p)6+126p5(1-p)4 + 36p7(1-p)2+p9 0.567108864 0.067108864
n P(1) =
s∑
k=0
C2k+1n p2k+1(1-p)n−(2k+1), where
s =
[
n−1
2
]
, [x]- rounded to integer of a lower value
can be done using an algorithm, similar to the one that calcu-
lates the remainders (mod) when raising a number to a large
power.
2 Finding an inverse matrix M−1 for any matrix M is also a
relatively simple task (a system of n2linear equations is to be
solved). The complexity of this algorithm is O (n2).
3 To find the rank of the group produced by the powers of the
matrix is an enumeration task. The addressee normally does
not have to know the rank of the group, its low estimate is
enough. The eavesdropper, however, will have to do full enu-
meration, even knowing the low estimate.
In this case, the encryption of the matrix M of a big rank can
openly be published. The secret message T (the text, the key, the
key matrix, etc) is encrypted by Alice as MaT. Bob additionally
encrypt the message by the matrix Mb and sends it back to Alice.
Alice removes her key by multiplying the message by the matrix
inverse toM then Bob removes his key and reads the message. It
should be noted that encryption is done simpler and faster than
finding the remainders (mod). If the rank of the matrix is higher
than 1040, then the eavesdropper will have to enumerate all the
variants, what seems a very difficult computing job.
Sine raising a matrix to a power and finding its inverse are
considered computational tasks solvable with polynomial algo-
rithms, and enumeration of all the powers of a matrix is done
with exponential algorithms, the unauthorized interceptor will
not be able to decrypt the message with matrices of large size.
Of course, to provide this, matrices of significantly larger size
have to be used, e.g. (150,150), then the upper limit of the power
of the cyclic group will be 2150 >1045. However, the algorithm
described above allows to build matrices of this large size.
There is another way to create a public key. Alice raises the
matrix M to her secret power k1and sends Mk1 to Bob. Bob
raises the same matrix M to the power k2 and sends Mk2 to
Alice. Alice raises the matrix received from Bob to the power
k1, and Bob raises the matrix received from Alice to the power
k2. Both get the common keyM k1k2. If the rank of matrixM is
equal to s, and the following conditions are met:
1 (s, k1) = 1 and
2 (s, k2) = 1,
then the rank of the matrix M k1k2is also equal to s. Otherwise,
if s > 1030, then k1 and k2 can be chosen from the same range,
and it is unlikely that the interceptor will find M k1k2.
Alice and Bob can exchange a few messages using the key
matrix M k1k2 and then create a new common matrix.
A few key matrices of different sizes M1(n1), M2(n2). . . can
be formed this way to encrypt the message T with their se-
quence, every time breaking the message into blocks of different
sizes, for example, encrypting M1M2 · T , and decrypting in the
inverse order using inverse matrices M−12 M
−1
1 M1M2 · T = T .
While transmitting messages over channels with high inter-
ference, the following scheme can be used: encryption – cod-
ing – transmission – decoding – decryption of the message. All
operations prove to be of the same type and can use the same
equipment.
Additional reinforcement of protection with double and
triple encryption. To strengthen protection of the entire message
or its fragments, encryption with two or even three different ma-
trices can be performed. With matrices M1 and M2 of the size
(18,18) and (20,20) respectively, we choose an arbitrary text:
‘The problem of misleading of illegal message interceptor
while transferring messages is being solved in the article. Dif-
ferent variants of intensified defense of some most important
fragments of messages with usage of both Boolean and matrix
transformations in the GF (2) Galois field of transferred text are
considered.’
We do subsequent encryption of this text with matrix M1 first,
and then with matrix M2.
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M1 =

111010001011011110
101001101110100111
111111000001001011
100101100100001111
100000101011100100
110010001101110000
011000100011001100
010100001001101101
101111100100100100
000000100110000010
010011010010010111
001111100100100100
011111111111100010
000000001001001101
101011001101110110
001001101010000000
000111000101001000
010010011001010111

,
M2 =

11001010111100110010
11110110100111010011
10001100101111010100
11011011111001001100
10100001010010011010
00001010100000101100
11101010010010011101
10100110001000100100
10110011011010001111
10000101100111101111
10001011110110111110
11101000000110010001
00011011010110000100
01010110101101001111
00001111110010010100
00110111001110001111
01010101101101100011
10111110010010111011
10110111110000101100
10010110010101111100

After encryption with the fist matrixM1 it will look like this:
74 80 97 91 24 108 98 85 27 14 116 79 96 114 23 121 71 39
40 43 10 104 38 0 40 5 100 64 100 8 109 104 108 39 9 44 101
96 90 62 125 20 115 93 42 16 103 10 45 38 104 45 31 60 100
103 76 106 59 93 46 91 42 24 114 69 118 48 113 119 5 40 34
124 79 108 109 86 63 74 50 19 62 91 115 36 120 117 79 44 102
111 4 119 47 82 48 16 60 77 41 85 108 48 57 33 69 106 55 8 15
72 40 113 123 88 81 38 32 48 72 37 16 52 54 99 50 45 78 108
96 67 106 69 33 68 115 1 104 97 36 114 82 104 59 125 28 49
49 20 107 7 55 69 37 68 46 100 118 34 64 47 41 42 73 61 104
26 111 11 125 71 44 14 119 113 96 114 23 49 32 101 80 35 38
6 53 77 125 15 45 9 121 112 47 113 0 119 100 38 30 100 51 26
38 27 43 31 48 88 52 108 121 100 76 49 119 42 24 101 32 88
42 1 56 77 23 94 85 47 125 41 89 25 51 58 78 38 34 66 102 12
37 6 47 5 44 102 56 101 28 61 55 125 119 82 56 56 12 37 51 71
72 71 119 2 4 110 106 69 15 103 59 98 62 47 85 56 51 95 22 19
93 119 38 120 0 16 103 124 30 53 116 29 125 64 63 87 123 77
46 55 54 60 20 47 44 96 16 98 102 86 43 64 97 94 60 4 36 33
102 121 68 43
And after the second encryption:
8 18 82 29 6 22 93 97 62 65 121 30 114 52 104 89 116 34 73
34 56 42 65 77 27 36 123 73 96 96 20 122 96 46 69 15 6 37 109
12 82 18 1 10 45 34 114 31 47 96 29 56 100 42 78 73 5 30 103
69 70 106 33 29 95 1 19 43 68 93 49 1 7 30 111 112 44 51 109
62 1 104 18 86 15 75 3 9 69 78 37 24 114 116 127 16 118 108
18 92 123 42 102 108 38 71 83 115 18 88 20 33 104 103 94 90
68 106 72 24 101 119 26 5 44 25 40 73 110 126 21 71 89 19 71
106 95 18 97 80 47 89 109 105 120 121 44 61 101 23 122 105
62 125 89 47 63 124 4 80 1 100 64 123 82 43 18 68 95 46 119
36 3 63 77 110 40 56 13 105 58 75 86 96 94 54 80 54 69 12 49
20 117 105 85 101 73 44 7 111 34 110 77 23 77 44 108 79 54
55 73 46 111 98 3 7 71 119 97 68 82 111 8 126 116 33 27 56 65
52 24 98 9 19 3 42 1 56 46 5 60 84 117 53 17 76 105 57 104 20
125 29 52 110 96 83 83 37 32 73 98 106 10 1 34 74 44 116 38
52 18 103 123 103 28 53 94 27 40 78 85 26 122 52 87 84 19 7
100 102 84 50 43 19 54 67 22 94 90 24 120 102 4 17 119 113
25 24 122 16 90 57 127 85 116 79 64 124 108 98 63 80 70 20
Having twice multiplied from the left the encrypted text by
the matrix M−12 , and then by the matrix M
−1
1 , we restore the
original text.
M−11 =

000000001001000000
010110011000010010
010000000011101100
000100001111010001
000101101011011011
101101010100010010
110001000100101011
010001000000000101
001000101101010010
010011101101100111
000100111110000011
100001000101000010
010010000111010011
111010111000101101
011110011000111111
001100011100101011
100110010011001111
111011101100010100

and
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M−12 =

00011110000001111011
11000101010101001100
11011110011011101111
10110110010001000100
01100110010110101100
00110011110110111010
01100010101010100100
00101000001000110111
01001010011111010011
00001111100011110011
00101010000010011100
00100010110100100010
00001010101110010010
01110011110110000101
00000111011010101110
11101101001110101111
11110000100111001101
10111101011110111000
11111000110110100000
10100110001001101011

6 Conclusions
The discussed method has a number of advantages over those
widely used. In particular, it employs logical, not arithmeti-
cal, processing procedures, which significantly speeds up en-
cryption/decryption. Method modifications allow for flexible
changes of the volume of the information to be encrypted, from
separate commands and text messages to colour images and
video streams, at the same time providing increased proof of
security of encryption at a lower speed, and vice versa.
Besides, software and hardware implementations are compat-
ible with correction codes, which allows to protect information
from both communication channel interference and unautho-
rized access.
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